Critical Infrastructure Protection
1. White Paper – Regulatory History of 10 CFR 50.54(p) and 50.90
In the field of nuclear security, facility plans are developed and revised in accordance with 10 CFR 50.54(p) and/or 50.90, depending on whether NRC approval is sought. However, the history of these regulations and the statements by the NRC provide insights into the meaning and use of the code. This white paper provides a discussion of regulations from 1956 to present, including analysis of input from NRC Generic Letters, Regulatory Issue Summaries, SECY paper, opinions from the NRC Office of General Counsel, and NEI guides that describe the evolution and current implementation of requirements governing changes to nuclear security plans.
2. Paper – Security for Alternative Nuclear Designs (published in the proceedings of the IAEA, 2013)
With the emergence of alternative nuclear designs, new methodologies for providing security are required. This paper focuses on programmatic changes that would make nuclear security at new plants more efficient, more effective, more adaptive to new plant designs, and less costly. It also addresses how government agencies involved with the nuclear industry can create an environment to allow this to happen.
3. Paper – Sharing Sensitive Information Across International Boundaries (published in the proceedings of the IAEA, 2013)
As new reactor designs are marketed around the world, critical components and systems are revealed in the drawings and functional descriptions. Traditional approaches to information protection would have concealed the location and functions of such systems to avoid revealing sensitive information in public documents. But with widespread marketing, the “design-specific” approach to information protection – which is widely circulated – to a “strategy-specific” protocol which is based on onsite and offsite resources, tactical decisions, and local efficiencies.
4. Paper – The Future of Nuclear Security (published in the proceedings of the IAEA, 2016)
Programs and practices in nuclear security continue to rely on installed technologies at facilities where the cost of abandoning them to acquire new, modernized systems cannot be justified. But that relegates most improvements to simply layering new systems upon old. The result is that most facility owners don’t take a clean, fresh look at systems and technologies that would vastly improve the security of the plant. This paper addresses how a security system might be designed with all of the new innovations at the disposal of the designers.